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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense has identified deficiencies with Professional Military 
Education (PME) as officer educational demands are not satisfactorily matching expected 
requirements within the strategic environment. Many senior military leaders 
and academics concur with the critiques of PME outlined in the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy, where former Secretary of Defense James Mattis asserted that the 
current “PME has stagnated … at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.” PME must 
evolve to match the demands of the strategic environment, which grows ever more 
complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid. This evolution is even more significant for 
Army Special Forces (SF) field grade officers (FGO), who are tasked to provide 
unique solutions to unconventional problems. SF FGOs require skills commensurate 
to the tasks they are expected to perform in this strategic environment; they must be 
adaptive problem solvers. This thesis provides a basis of analysis for demonstration 
that strategic thinking is a timeless and proven skill that has enabled special 
operations officers to influence successful outcomes throughout modern military 
history. Furthermore, this research will show that a PME focused on decision-making, 
specifically developing SF FGO strategic thinking skills, will prepare them to influence 
successful outcomes and meet the nation’s strategic objectives now and in the future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Not since the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 has there been a major 
contribution or enhancement to professional military education (PME). The GNA provided 
the framework and incentive for joint interaction, cooperation, and integration amongst the 
services, thus increasing the organizational effectiveness and lethality of the United States’ 
military overall.1  Further, PME was restructured to complement the interoperability of 
services by requiring joint education to be mandatory for those serving in joint operations 
or joint billets. These changes were led by Congress and senior military leaders to increase 
the “intellectual agility” of service officers by facilitating the sharing of each service’s 
lessons learned, warfighting techniques, and integration of air, land, and sea power.2  
Although the GNA did not dictate individual service PME requirements, it did set the path 
for PME to reach the point it is today, as the foundation for programs such as the Officer 
Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). However, the PME programs and 
guidelines enacted over the past three decades have remained relatively unchanged, minus 
adaptions to incorporate modern conflicts’ lessons learned the continuing debate over the 
academic rigor of PME and the preferred PME venues.3 
A. THE PROBLEM 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), signed by Former Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis, identifies the current PME as deficient. It specifically highlights 
that PME “has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the 
expense of lethality and ingenuity.”4  Although this statement can infer many conclusions, 
                                                 
1 Kristy N Kamarck, “Goldwater-Nichols and the Evolution of Officer Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME)” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2016), 2. 
2 Kamarck, “Goldwater-Nichols and the Evolution of Officer Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME),” 3; Kevin Kelley and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Rethinking Professional Military Education - Foreign 
Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 25, 2013, https://www.fpri.org/
article/2013/10/rethinking-professional-military-education/. 
3 Nicholas Murray, “Rigor in Joint Professional Military Education,” War on the Rocks, February 19, 
2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/rigor-in-joint-professional-military-education/. 
4 Department of Defense, Summary of National Defense Strategy (Department of Defense, 2018), 8. 
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it is clear that the military’s senior leaders believe that the current PME does not meet the 
educational requirements of military officers. Criticism of PME has not only been provided 
by senior military leaders, as many academics have also joined the discussion. The PME 
discussion is complex as it involves all military services and a multitude of occupational 
specialties, which arguably have different educational requirements. This research focuses 
specifically on PME regarding Army Special Forces (SF) and the aspects of PME that 
hinder optimal educational outputs for SF officers. Current PME is structured to apply to 
all officers regardless of occupational specialty, teaches a linear decision-making process, 
and emphasizes tactics and technology that may prove to be ephemeral. SF officers, and 
more specifically FGOs, are expected to conduct unique tasks in an unconventional 
strategic environment characterized as complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid where 
their actions can have strategic implications. They require skills that transcend faddish 
technologies and tactics to identify problems accurately and provide the appropriate 
solutions for them. They need to be adaptive problem solvers; thus, SF officers would 
benefit from a PME focus on non-linear decision-making. 
B. THE END STATE  
This research contributes to the PME discussion regarding how the Army can meet 
the educational requirements of SF field grad officers (FGO) and prepare them for the 
demands of the current and future strategic environments. Specifically, it answers what 
skills enable an SF FGO to influence success in the strategic environment?; and then, what 
skills must ILE programs develop in SF FGOs to prepare them for the challenges of the 
future strategic environment?  This research aligns with the need for intellectual agility 
outlined in the GNA, and advocates for PME to produce SF FGOs who are adaptive 
problem solvers. This research argues that SF FGOs require the development of skills 
commensurate to their specific tasks and the strategic environment in which they are 
expected to employ them. SF are expected to provide solutions to unconventional problems 
in a strategic environment characterized as complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid; 
where their actions can have strategic consequences. Preparing for these unconventional 
challenges is difficult as adversaries do not telegraph their unconventional strategies and 
the strategic environment continues to change. Thus, a PME that emphasizes a linear 
3 
decision-making process and current tactics and technologies is of limited utility for SF 
FGOs. Thus, this research proposes that Army PME develop strategic thinking skills for 
SF officers to best prepare them to influence successful outcomes and meet the nation’s 
strategic objectives. Strategic thinking is an all-encompassing term defined in Chapter IV 
as a non-linear, holistic, and adaptive decision-making process that draws from creative 
solutions to establish a competitive advantage within the environment. Five cognitive 
competencies form the skill of strategic thinking: systems thinking, thinking in time, 
critical thinking, creative thinking, and intuitive thinking. These competencies were 
demonstrated throughout modern military history by special operations leaders who 
influenced successful outcomes in their strategic environments. Strategic thinking is a 
timeless and proven skill that will best prepare SF FGOs to influence success now and in 
the future. 
This research does not provide detailed solutions for immediate implementation 
into current PME; rather, it serves as the initial step towards solution development by 
identifying a focus for PME on developing strategic thinking skills for SF FGOs. This 
research does not claim that strategic thinking is only beneficial to SF FGOs as other 
services may have occupational specialties with similar education demands. It also does 
not claim that certain segments of the current Army PME are not vitally important to every 
officer in the Army, including SF officers. For example, the Military Decision Making 
Process (MDMP), Army Design Methodology, Army doctrine, and various tactics 
techniques and procedures (TTP) are necessary for all Army officers to know and apply 
within their organizations. PME must not eliminate these fundamental aspects from its 
education program, nor reduced in exposure to any branch of the Army, especially SF. This 
research recommends follow-on studies that identify proven methods and processes that 
develop strategic thinking through the five competencies. Subsequently, an evaluation of 
Army PME should identify what requirements are currently being met in strategic thinking 
development and where it is deficient. Courses of action and implementation plans can 
then be developed for Army PME that addresses the development of strategic thinking for 
SF FGOs. Failure to meet the specific educational demands of Army SF FGOs will hinder 
4 
the preparedness for the unconventional challenges of the strategic environment and their 
ability to influence successful outcomes. 
C. THE ROADMAP 
The subsequent chapters answer the research questions in a sequential process 
through both a qualitative research method consisting of an evaluation of academic 
literature and comparative case study analyses. The subsequent chapters establish the 
argument by describing deficiencies in PME, answering why SF FGOs require a different 
educational focus, defining strategic thinking and the cognitive competencies that form it, 
showing the impact of strategic thinking as demonstrated by special operations leaders 
throughout modern military history, and advocating for changes to PME regarding SF. 
Chapter II describes the deficiencies in PME as they relate to SF officers and their 
implications. This chapter provides a brief history of Army PME and highlights PME’s 
deficiencies based on critiques provided by senior military leaders, academics, and FGOs. 
Chapter III explains why SF FGOs require a different educational focus. It describes the 
contemporary and future strategic environment, explains the uniqueness of SOF with 
emphasis on Army SF, and discusses the nature of their operations in the strategic 
environment to highlight the requirement of Strategic Thinking skills for SF FGOs. Chapter 
IV defines strategic thinking and cognitive competencies. It begins with an overview of 
strategic thinking as it pertains to the military and discusses the competencies associated 
with strategic thinking that would most benefit SF FGOs. Chapter V provides case study 
analyses of special operations leaders throughout modern military history who 
demonstrated strategic thinking and influenced successful outcomes. Finally, Chapter VI 
concludes the research by providing a summary of the key points and provides 
recommendations for future research aligned towards solution development and 
implementation. 
5 
II. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
The current Army professional military education (PME) is not specifically tailored 
to meet the educational requirements of Army Special forces (SF) Field Grade Officers 
(FGO). As stated in Chapter I, recent questions have arisen as to the U.S. military’s ability 
to provide its officers the proper education across all the services. This overarching 
problem was underscored in 2018 when former Secretary of Defense Mattis discussed 
PME as a priority in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and also bluntly announced its 
faltering state by declaring that “PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment 
of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.”5  One can infer from this 
statement that the quality of the military officer has declined to the point of necessitating 
national attention. Retired Brigadier General Paula Thornhill, now a senior political 
scientist at the RAND Corporation, laments how the service schools “fail to produce the 
officers their services need” and cites discussions and articles of many field and flag 
officers who continue to speak out against the current programs.6  Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist Tom Ricks, who specializes and focuses on military and national security issues, 
highlighted grades assigned by senior military leaders currently serving based upon a 
holistic view of the quality of current Army education in developing our future mid and 
senior-level officers. The grades averaged a mediocre level by the senior leadership. Ricks, 
however, assigned his grade to Army education: 
[I would] give the Army a C-. But I would add that it still does better than 
the Air Force, where there is so little familiarity with strategic thinking that 
someone who does come up with an idea tends to be dangerous because 
they don’t know how to handle it.”  To make a claim clearer and more direct, 
he stated that the leaders produced at the service schools would “certainly 
not [be] someone you’d want to hire to plan your next war.7 
                                                 
5 Department of Defense, Summary of National Defense Strategy (Department of Defense, 2018), 8. 
6 Paula Thornhill, “To Produce Strategists, Focus on Staffing Senior Leaders,” War on the Rocks, 
Special Series - Educating the Force, July 20, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/to-produce-
strategists-focus-on-staffing-senior-leaders/. 
7 Thomas E. Ricks, “How Good Is the Army at Training Strategic Leaders? Not Very, Apparently,” 
Task & Purpose (blog), July 23, 2018, https://taskandpurpose.com/army-war-college-strategic-leaders. 
6 
Mattis’, Thornhill’s, and Ricks’ statements are a broad and overarching assessment 
of the problem every service has with their respective education programs. A single 
solution, however, does not apply to every service as each maintains different missions, 
capabilities, and requirements. No two service PME problems will be the same, and a one 
size fits all fix or approach will not sufficiently address every one of those issues. As such, 
Army SF FGOs require a different educational focus to develop skills that will prepare 
them to influence successful outcomes in an unconventional strategic environment.  
A. ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
The Army’s PME program is founded upon the Officer Education System (OES) 
and developed “to provide an education and training system operationally relevant to the 
current environment, but structured to support the future environment by producing more 
capable, adaptable and confident leaders.”8  The OES is a one size fits all developmental 
approach to the officer corps, currently resting at 90,000 members.9 OES education is 
commensurate to the officer’s rank and expected responsibilities and as such, is tailored to 
assess and develop the skills necessary to succeed.  
The Army accomplishes officer development through three significant blocks of 
formal education following the basic initial training each Soldier attends. First, for the rank 
of Captain (CPT), the Captain’s Career Course (CCC) is specific to the Soldier’s career 
path categories. For example, the combat arms branches of the Army attend combat arms 
focused CCC at Ft. Benning, GA. The course emphasizes combined arms tactics and low-
level leadership development skills required for tactical operations. The other branches of 
the Army attend various CCCs located at various other locations. Second, following the 
promotion to Major (MAJ) is Intermediate Learning Education (ILE) PME, which focuses 
on the operational level of war. All Army field grade officers, with a few exceptions, attend 
the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) located at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 
                                                 
8 Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3: Development and Career Management (Department of the 
Army, 2014), 24. 
9 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Occupational Outlook Handbook,” Military Careers (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Labor, September 19, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/ooh/military/military-careers.htm. 
7 
regardless of career branch. This is due to the Army’s chosen path that it believes ILE is to 
be branch immaterial and general enough to be effective for all branches of the Army.10  
Third, following promotion to Colonel (COL), the Army War College (AWC) focuses on 
the strategic level of war. Officers in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) are required to 
attend Senior Service College (SSC), but the attendance of this institution does not provide 
formal required leadership education.11 
B. ARMY FIELD GRADE OFFICER EDUCATION 
Although every block of Army PME is important in holistic officer development, 
it is the jump from a company-grade officer (CGO) to field grade officer (FGO) that can 
be considered the most instrumental in an officer’s career, as ILE educates FGOs for 
approximately the next ten years. FGOs inherit the largest time gap before their next 
educational opportunity compared to other officer ranks.12  Increased responsibilities and 
expanded authority further elevate the significance of ILE for FGOs and highlight the 
pivotal role it serves in mid-career development. The increase in FGO responsibilities is 
commensurate to positions often situated above tactical units. Most FGOs serve an 
operational level function, such as primary battalion (BN) and brigade (BDE) planners, BN 
executive officers, and various other senior staff positions under combatant commands 
(COCOM). A smaller portion will have an arguably even greater responsibility as 
commanders. For SF FGOs, this includes command at the company level and BN. As 
commanders and leaders of staff sections, the mentoring of junior leaders come to a critical 
juncture as it is the junior officers who will execute the guidance and intent of the 
commanding FGO on the battlefield. CGOs will look to those newly promoted FGOs, who 
were not long ago in their shoes, for guidance, leadership advice, and professional 
                                                 
10 Jack Kem and William Bassett, “The Right Education and Training at the Right Time: Deciding 
What to Teach and Ensuring It Happens,” Army University Press, accessed October 7, 2019, 
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Journal-of-Military-Learning/Journal-of-Military-Learning-
Archives/April-2018-Edition/The-Right-Education-and-Training-at-the-Right-Time/. 
11 Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3: Development and Career Management, 17. 
12 Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 17. 
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development.13  Army PME needs to meet the specific FGO educational demands of each 
branch. PME tailored to meet the specific requirements for SF FGOs will prepare them to 
influence successful organizational and operational outcomes at every level. 
CGSS is considered the premier venue for Army officers to earn ILE certification, 
PME required lessons mandated by the Army, and move on to assume FGO positions 
throughout the force.14  CGSS’s current mission statement asserts that it “educates field 
grade officers to be agile, innovative, and adaptive leaders within increasingly complex 
and uncertain environments. Contemporary field grade officers are those who 
communicate effectively, think critically, and can build and lead organizations under 
mission command in Unified Land Operations.”15  CGSS is validated and accredited by 
three separate institutions, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s process for accrediting joint education (PAJE), and the U.S. 
Department of Education’s North Central Association Higher Learning Commission 
(HLC).16  The school asserts itself as utilizing a cutting-edge educational curriculum 
focused on “active and collaborative learning techniques and encourages an open dialog of 
our student’s vast experiences” while developing the student’s skills on Army-specific 
tasks such as mastering the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).17  Review of 
CGSS common course curriculum highlights a focus on military processes, operational 
                                                 
13 Thang Tran et al., “Ignorance and Professional Military Education: The Case for Operational 
Engagement,” War on the Rocks, November 7, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/ignorance-and-
professional-military-education-the-case-for-operational-engagement/. 
14 Thomas E. Ricks, “CGSS Prof: PME Not as Bad as You Feared—but Still Not as Valued as You 
May Wish,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed February 9, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/17/
CGSS-prof-pme-not-as-bad-as-you-feared-but-still-not-as-valued-as-you-may-wish/. 
15 Command and General Staff, “Command and General Staff School (CGSS) | U.S. Army Combined 
Arms Center,” accessed February 9, 2019, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/CGSS/cgss. 
16 Bernard F Harris, “Mandatory Accreditation and The U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College,” Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning 41 (2014): 191–98. 
17 Michelle Miller, James Pennington, and Billy Miller, “U.S. Army Increases Rigor at the Command 
and General Staff College,” Arthur D. Simons Center, accessed May 20, 2019, http://thesimonscenter.org/
u-s-army-increases-rigor-at-cgsc/. 
9 
force capabilities and limitations, history of conventional warfare, and general discussions 
on leadership and varying styles, to name a few.18 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW:  THE DEFICIENCIES OF ARMY 
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
The awareness raised by Mattis in the NDS19 and by other senior leaders in military 
affairs20 focused on broad arguments levied against education and the officers released 
from the service institutions. There is a deeper discussion, however, on the Army’s ability 
to produce effective leaders at the FGO level, directly related to critiques from the NDS. 
There are several common themes discussed by current and former military leaders, 
educators, and military experts regarding what PME lacks or where it falls short. The PME 
deficiencies they highlight include officers who lack strategic thinking, an educational 
emphasis on linear decision-making processes, and a focus on faddish tactics and 
techniques. These deficiencies have a direct impact on Army SF officers and their 
preparedness to meet the demands of the unconventional strategic environment. 
A narrow educational focus limits the Army’s ability to develop strategic thinkers. 
Army Colonel Edward Ballanco stated that the current Army education program focuses 
too much on the development of a “one-dimensional leader” who is not suited for today’s 
military.21  He explains that being one-dimensional might make the officer an expert in 
one field, but to be a strategic thinker, and be able to operate at higher levels of operations 
requires a broader education, not more training. Dr. Thomas Bruscino, a faculty member 
at the AWC, believes that the Army has lost sight of its view of what a strategic thinker is, 
                                                 
18 Command and General Staff, “Command and General Staff Officers’ Course Summary | U.S. Army 
Combined Arms Center,” accessed February 10, 2019, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/CGSS/
courses. 
19 Department of Defense, Summary of National Defense Strategy. 
20 Thomas E. Ricks, “Finally, Official Recognition That the Army’s CGSC Is Broken: A Follow Up,” 
Foreign Policy (blog), accessed February 10, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/01/finally-official-
recognition-that-the-armys-cgsc-is-broken-a-follow-up/; Paula Thornhill, “To Produce Strategists, Focus on 
Staffing Senior Leaders,” War on the Rocks, Special Series - Educating the Force, July 20, 2018, 
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21 “Whiteboard: How Well Does the Army Develop Strategic Leaders?,” U.S. Army War College War 
Room (blog), June 25, 2018, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/special-series/whiteboard/wb01-leader-
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and in doing so, cannot convey that to those it teaches daily.22  Finally, Army Colonel 
Brian Rauen articulated that Army PME can “certainly sharpen a capable leader’s blade” 
in that it produces a better officer then what came in. However, COL Rauen concluded that 
“it won’t turn proverbial plowshares into swords,” alluding that the training at CGSS will 
not produce a strategic thinker in the ten months allotted at CGSS ILE; an FGO prepared 
to face the challenges of the strategic environment.23  These critiques highlight a demand 
for FGOs to develop strategic thinking skills and the current deficiency of PME to fulfill 
the demand. 
Army PME aligns with liner decision-making processes that do not prepare FGOs 
for the type of thinking required to solve complex problems in the strategic environment. 
The fluid nature of the strategic environment demands thinkers who are adaptive and, as 
such, officers who can think non-linearly. MAJ Jamie Schwandt, an Army Reserve Officer 
and recent graduate of the Army PME, graded various aspects of the program. Although 
the program received high grades for history and electives selection, critical thinking 
received a D, the lowest grade.24  The skill of critical thinking is a significant contributor 
to strategic thinking, a non-linear decision-making process.25  MAJ McIlwaine also offers 
a critique regarding thinking and states that the program “perhaps isn’t the best 
environment for bringing out truly individual thinkers.”26  Initiative and the ability to think 
individually are vital for decision-making in the strategic environment, especially when 
conducting operations in remote areas away from headquarters staffs and when lacking 
time to make decisions. GEN Dempsey highlights the demand for these qualities to succeed 
                                                 
22 “Whiteboard: How Well Does the Army Develop Strategic Leaders?” 
23 “Whiteboard: How Well Does the Army Develop Strategic Leaders?” 
24 Jamie Schwandt, “It’s A Big Deal: An Officer Grades the Army Staff College and Its Leadership,” 
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25 William Stewart Weyhrauch, “A Mindset for Strategic Thinking: Developing a Concept and 
Measure” (Dissertation, 2016), https://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/32581. 
26 Tom Mcllwaine, “In Defense of CGSC: It Produces the Worker Bees Every Army Needs,” Task & 
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in the strategic environment in his Mission Command white paper.27  He explains that 
leaders must possess the ability to make instantaneous decisions to succeed against 
adaptable enemies. GEN Dempsey also states that the key to this success is leaders that can 
“understand the problem, envision an end state, and visualize the nature and design of the 
operation” while maintaining “mental agility, and superior speed in competitive cycles of 
decision making.”28  The current and future strategic environments will also often require 
unique solutions to problems that cannot be trained for, further highlighting the demand 
for developing non-linear decision-making skills for FGOs rather than an emphasis on 
situation-specific training. A British Army officer describes the latter as the current focus 
of Army PME in his article titled In Defense Of CGSS: It Produces The Worker Bees Every 
Army Needs.29  He describes the CGSS portion as a training course tailored to produce 
officers “capable and competent in a relatively narrow range of skills.”30  This highlights 
an educational output of officers who know “what to think,” which is relevant for solving 
more linear problems where complexity is easily defined such as “synchronization of Joint 
Fires,”31 rather than producing officers who know “how to think” for solving the non-
linear problems described by the JCS.32 
Army PME overemphasizes its educational program on the demands of the current 
strategic environment and not enough on those of the future. The U.S. military has a history 
of preparing for the previous conflict and not being prepared for the next one or focusing 
                                                 
27 Martin Dempsey, “Mission Command White Paper” (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
April 3, 2012), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/
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28 Dempsey, “Mission Command White Paper,” 4. 
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32 Nicholas Murray, “The Role of Professional Military Education in Mission Command,” Joint 
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on the next conflict while forgetting the lessons learned from the war most recently fought. 
Some believe the Army is reliving the mistakes of the past once again. David Fitzgerald 
highlighted many of these points in his book Learning to Forget: U.S. Army 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq. Fitzgerald wrote that in 
1972, following the grueling years of war in Vietnam, the focus was no longer on 
counterinsurgency (COIN) but a shift towards conventional strategic war in Europe.33  The 
parallel can be seen in recent history as the U.S. Army moves away from a COIN focus 
from the last 18 years in Afghanistan and Iraq, and towards a focus on great power 
competition versus Russia and China.34  Following the publication of FM 100–5 
Operations in 1976, today known as FM 3-0 Operations, then Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) General DePuy insisted that following Vietnam, the focus of the 
Army would be “more about reaffirming a core Army identity than about fighting the next 
war.”35  These same actions are seen in the most recent Operations field manual, 
specifically focusing again on war in Europe.36  The Army’s trend towards a focus on one 
specific threat can significantly reduce readiness to face threats in a strategic environment 
that is often uncertain and ambiguous. This can be especially limiting for SF FGOs who 
must be prepared for the unexpected challenges of the unconventional strategic 
environment. SF FGOs require skills that are timeless and facilitate adaptive problem 
solving to influence success in this environment. 
D. CONCLUSION 
PME can prepare SF FGOs to influence successful outcomes in the unconventional 
strategic environment by developing their strategic thinking skills. This will enable SF 
FGOs to be adaptive problem solvers and provide the unique solutions expected of them. 
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The current PME’s lack of strategic thinking development, emphasis on linear decision-
making processes, and a focus on faddish tactics and techniques hinder SF FGO 
preparedness for the current and future strategic environments. Although some 
occupational specialties will benefit from the current PME, SF FGOs require a different 
educational focus. This is not to say that SF FGOs will not benefit from core competencies 
such as the military decision-making process (MDMP) and Army Design Methodology 
(ADM), which are necessary, but they should not be the focus for their PME. SF FGOs 
need strategic thinking skills to influence success in the strategic environment, which is 
commensurate with their expected tasks and goes beyond just the tactical and operational 
level currently emphasized in PME.37  Chapter III will highlight the requirement of 
strategic thinking skills for SF FGOs by describing the contemporary and future strategic 
environments, explain the uniqueness of SOF with emphasis on Army SF and discuss the 
nature of their operations in the strategic environment.  
                                                 
37 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Mission, Vision, Priorities, Principles, & College-Level 
Learning Outcomes,” January 28, 2016, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/cgsc/mission. 
14 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
15 
III. ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC 
THINKING SKILLS 
Planners and operators most in demand in this difficult task 
[Unconventional Warfare] will be those capable of thinking critically and 
creatively, warriors unhindered by the need for continuous and detailed 
guidance. Such special operators will be most capable of performing critical 
UW tasks under politically sensitive conditions, ensuring that they can 
serve, in the tradition of their Jedburgh predecessors, as true warrior-
diplomats.38 
The demand for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), more specifically, Army 
Special Forces (SF) is increasing as the strategic environment grows ever more 
complicated and the future more uncertain. It is an environment void of routine solutions 
to problems and instead requires a better understanding of the environment through critical 
analysis to produce creative and adaptive solutions. This description is not unique to the 
contemporary environment, or the one predicted for the future; it is instead a timeless 
reality. The emphasis for SF Field Grade Officers (FGO) during PME should be on 
developing strategic thinking skills. SF are employed to provide unique solutions to 
problems in environments of increased political risk characterized as complex, uncertain, 
ambiguous, and fluid; where the consequences of their actions impact the strategic goals 
of the nation. The success of SF in the future strategic environment relies on SF FGO 
strategic thinking to navigate the environment while employing unique solutions towards 
problems suited for SF that meet the nation’s strategic objectives. This chapter will 
describe the contemporary and future strategic environments, explain the uniqueness of 
SOF with emphasis on Army SF, and discuss the nature of their operations in the strategic 
environment to highlight the requirement of strategic thinking skills for SF FGOs. 
A. THE CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
States and non-state actors are more likely to employ unconventional warfare to 
achieve their objectives in the future strategic environment. It is impossible to predict the 
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future, much less to accurately define the future strategic environment, but it is possible to 
focus in on trends as indicators of change in the environment and adopt strategies to deal 
with emerging challenges. The U.S. government uses these indicators to define the current 
and future environments and outlines the nation’s strategy in the President’s National 
Security Strategy (NSS) from which the Department of Defense produces the military’s 
supporting strategy through the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Governments often 
overtly broadcast conventional capability to signal military strength, making predictions of 
the future and developing such strategies as the NDS a little easier. Whether it is Russia 
announcing a new special purpose submarine capable of carrying multiple underwater 
drones,39 China releasing footage of the “Guam Killer” ballistic missile that can 
supposedly strike moving targets like aircraft carriers,40 or North Korea testing ballistic 
missiles for signaling its strike capability or intercontinental reach41; these conventional 
military capabilities are easier to plan for. Predicting the future in regard to unconventional 
warfare is more difficult because of the clandestine requirement often needed to achieve 
outcomes. In contrast to the overt announcements of conventional capability, Russia’s 
employment of “little green men” to influence desired strategic objectives in Crimea was 
unannounced and unforeseen by NATO allies, demonstrating the evolving nature of 
conflict and preferred means used by state-actors to assert influence without crossing a 
threshold that incites war.42  States will likely continue overt advancement of conventional 
military capability and avoid large scale military confrontations with peer adversaries in 
this era of great power competition. States will rather seek to influence and meet strategic 
objectives through unconventional warfare just as the Russians have demonstrated. U.S. 
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military strategy will rely heavily on the strategic thinking abilities of SF FGOs to identify 
current and future unconventional threats and provide appropriate solutions that meet the 
nation’s strategic objectives. 
The future strategic environment will be disorderly, competitive, rapidly changing, 
and robust with unconventional challenges that will require unconventional solutions. The 
NSS and NDS describe the future strategic environment with the reemergence of long-term 
political, economic, and military competition43 by revisionist powers such as Russia and 
China.44  Fierce competition will feed a more dangerous environment and add further 
complexity and uncertainty.45  The disorder will emerge as a result of the employment of 
hybrid warfare capabilities by state and non-state actors, scarcity of resources, ecological 
challenges, toxic ideologies, and technology.46  State and non-state actors will seek to 
challenge U.S. international influence while expanding their own through hybrid warfare 
while violating principles of “sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring 
the lines between civil and military goals.”47  States will incorporate conventional, 
irregular, information, and cyber capabilities in their hybrid warfare strategy as this indirect 
approach will continue to be the coercive method of choice to achieve gains without 
provoking an international response.48  The complex and fluid nature of this type of 
warfare will require creative and adaptive solutions from the SF FGOs that will be tasked 
with carrying out the nations UW strategy. 
Some variables in the strategic environment have changed or been replaced by 
others, but this environment is not new. The contemporary strategic environment was 
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similar to the one that followed the Second World War with competition between two great 
powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, that sparked the Cold War. Instead of confronting 
each other through large scale conventional warfare, the U.S. and the Soviet Union chose 
proxy warfare, which included significant investment in unconventional warfare to spread 
their influence throughout the globe. The U.S.’s predictions of the future strategic 
environment in the early 1950s led to the recognition of a capability gap in the U.S. 
military. A permanent special operations capability with a focus on unconventional warfare 
was created to meet the unconventional challenges of the future. 
B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) serve an important function for meeting the 
United States Government (USG) policy objectives by expanding the range of options 
available to decision makers49 through all instruments of national power.50  This 
expansion of options is derived from the unique capabilities and capacity of U.S. SOF to 
influence strategic objectives that cannot be fulfilled by conventional forces, or when the 
use of such forces is not appropriate. SOF are often the military option of choice because 
of what they can achieve through a small footprint while avoiding costly long-term 
commitments of major combat forces.51  SOF exist to conduct special operations, which 
the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs defines as: 
Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, 
equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive environments and characterized by  one or more of the following: 
time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through 
indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of 
risk.52 
The degree of political risk assumed by SOF when employed in hostile, denied, or 
politically sensitive environments is a significant feature of special operations. 
                                                 
49 John M. Collins, Special Operations Forces, an Assessment (Washington, D.C: National Defense 
University Press, 1994), 6. 
50 Department of Defense, JP 3-05: Special Operations (Department of Defense, 2014), ix. 
51 Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” 102. 
52 Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05: Special Operations, 1–1. 
19 
Compounding, the nature of these environments are characteristics such as complexity, 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and fluidity. (in pursuit of excellence ch.9, p. 119)   This 
environment is not defined easily in terms of black and white; rather it is ambiguous with 
muddled interpretations  “regarding the nature of the conflict, the parties involved or the 
relevant policy and legal frameworks.”53  States, non-state actors, civilian populations, 
criminal organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO)s comprise a multitude 
of stakeholders that interact with each other and seek to influence the environment in a 
variety of ways for differing purposes. The interconnected web created by these 
stakeholders produces as much uncertainty as it does complexity. Not all stakeholders play 
by established rules, so predicting expected outcomes poses a significant challenge. 
Technological advances expand possibilities and transform the means stakeholders use to 
interact with the environment, while climate change, access to resources, and globalization 
represent just a few more of the many additional variables that contribute to the complexity 
and fluidity of this environment.54 
C. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
The first U.S. special operations forces, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 
demonstrated their strategic utility in World War II through guerrilla warfare and covert 
operations. The importance of an unconventional warfare capability appeared behind the 
curtain of conventional war. The years following WWII saw the decommissioning of the 
OSS while a new threat emerged in the form of the Cold War. The U.S. and Soviet Union 
were locked in fierce competition for global influence as the threat of nuclear war loomed. 
As the threat of nuclear war increased, so did the realization of the devastating 
consequences it would produce. The arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
continued, while the battle for global influence took place in proxy locations with each side 
avoiding direct confrontation with one another. President Kennedy described the warfare 
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shift of this period as one that “relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere 
of influence—on infiltration instead of invasion, on subversion instead of elections, on 
intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day.”55  This 
change in the strategic environment led the U.S. military to once again, develop an 
unconventional warfare capability within the U.S. Army.56 
On 20 June 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was established to 
conduct unconventional warfare (UW), primarily through support to indigenous guerrilla 
forces.57  Special Forces (SF) was intended to “develop, organize, equip, train, and direct 
indigenous guerrilla forces in the event of war or when the opportunity presents itself.”58  
Today, the U.S. military defines UW as “Activities conducted to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power 
by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied 
area.”59  
Since its inception, SF has been employed to conduct a variety of missions, both in 
times of peace and war. During the early years of the Cold War, SF trained with NATO 
partners and built relationships with critical populations throughout Europe in preparation 
for the conduct of UW into Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, East Germany, or 
Poland.60  In Vietnam, SF supported U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts by equipping, 
training, and advising the Montagnard tribesmen of the Central Highlands to counter North 
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Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.61  The later years of the Cold War era brought a shift 
in U.S. military attention to Soviet support for guerrilla movements in Latin America and 
investment in low-intensity conflict.62  SF advised the Salvadoran Armed Forces to defeat 
the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgency63 and provided special 
operations capabilities in support of Operation JUST CAUSE to neutralize the Panama 
Defense Force and provide a stable environment for a freely elected government.64  During 
the Gulf War, SF trained and accompanied a Pan Arab force consisting of Kuwaitis, Saudis, 
Egyptians, and Syrians in support of coalition ground operations to liberate Kuwait.65  
More recently, SF performed UW as they advised the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to 
remove the Taliban from power in 2001, advised the Kurds of Northern Iraqi to topple the 
Saddam Hussein regime, and advised counter-insurgent forces in the Philippines in support 
of the Global War on Terrorism.66  Today, SF continues to be employed in all Geographic 
Combatant Commands (GCCs) as the demand for their capabilities has only increased. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The future strategic environment will continue to pose unconventional challenges 
that require unconventional solutions. As such, demand for SF will only increase as they 
are called on to provide these solutions. They will continue to prove their strategic value 
through their ability to discretely navigate and thrive in complex, uncertain, ambiguous, 
and fluid environments with a precision.67  They will likely operate autonomously and will 
routinely find themselves in austere locations without access to organic military support or 
detailed guidance from a higher headquarters. SF will influence the strategic environment 
by working with indigenous populations, militaries, and governments for which they are 
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suited with their language capability and cultural astuteness. The strategic environment 
will not be short of surprises as the nature of SF work will often require them to transition 
seamlessly between diplomat and warrior within any given day, or operate in relative 
stability in an environment of chaos requiring a shift to crisis management. The 
consequences of their employment in these environments, whether it be through a tactical 
operation or by the plans and decisions of SOF leaders at the operational or strategic levels 
of war,68 impact the strategic goals of the nation.69  SF FGO success in the strategic 
environment will require strategic thinking to determine the best course of action in 
stressful high-risk scenarios.70 
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IV. CORE COMPETENCIES OF MILITARY STRATEGIC 
THINKING  
The current and future strategic environments are not uniquely different from those 
of the past, these environments are still complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this reality is timeless, and the challenges that emerge 
from these environments require a non-linear approach to problem-solving and decision 
making. These types of problems are not solvable by following a strict linear decision-
making process similar to a checklist to reach the desired solution or plan of action. 
Successful Special Operations officers in modern military history have navigated these 
environments and produced desired outcomes because they possessed the skill of strategic 
thinking. The same cognitive competencies that enabled those officers’ success can aid 
current Army SF FGOs and those of the future to understand the strategic environment and 
produce unique solutions that meet the nation’s strategic objectives. This chapter will 
provide an overview of strategic thinking skill as it pertains to the military and discuss the 
competencies associated with strategic thinking that would most benefit SF FGOs. 
A. THE CASE FOR STRATEGIC THINKING 
Like most academic works produced on strategic thinking, this chapter will begin 
by stating that there is not a single accepted definition for strategic thinking. However, 
most literature on strategic thinking, whether it be civilian or military draws from notable 
contemporary works of authors such as Henry Mintzberg and Jeanne Liedtka. Henry 
Mintzberg provided an important distinction between strategic planning and strategic 
thinking by describing planning as a process of analysis and strategic thinking as one of 
synthesis.71  In this context, Spencer describes strategic planning in her book, Thinking for 
Impact, as “assigning processes and resources to achieve a desired end-state,”72 and 
strategic thinking is a continuous process of ensuring the desired end-state is realized. The 
                                                 
71 Henry Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” Harvard Business Review, January 1, 
1994, https://hbr.org/1994/01/the-fall-and-rise-of-strategic-planning. 
72 Spencer, Thinking for Impact, 15. 
24 
allocation of Army SF ODAs to a region in Africa tasked to disrupt violent extremist 
organizations (VEO) in support of regional stability would be a very simplistic example of 
a strategic plan. Conversely, strategic thought would be the continuous assessment of the 
environment and the adaptive and creative solutions produced by the ODAs to reach the 
goal of disrupting VEOs, and ultimately moving closer to realizing the end-state of regional 
stability. Roughly four years after Mintzberg’s influential work, Liedtka broke down the 
skill of strategic thinking into five attributes:   a systems perspective, intent-focused, 
intelligent opportunism, thinking in time, and hypothesis-driven. The influence of 
Liedtka’s model is noticeable in several contemporary works such as those commonly cited 
of Yarger73 and Bonn74  that establish competencies for strategic thinking with Yarger 
focusing at the individual level and Bonn on the individual and organizational level.75  The 
remainder of this chapter will provide an understanding of what strategic thinking is and 
the cognitive competencies it encompasses. This will be attained by drawing from the 
relevant contemporary strategic thinking literature of Yarger (2008), Waters (2011), 
McCauley (2016), Sackett et al. (2016), Young (2016), and Spencer (2018) who address 
strategic thinking for the military. The competencies identified in this chapter will serve as 
the lens through which to observe the actions of special operations leaders in modern 
history who demonstrated strategic thinking and the impact the skill had towards reaching 
desired outcomes. 
1. Defining Strategic Thinking 
Strategic thinking is a non-linear, holistic, and adaptive decision-making process 
that draws from creative solutions to establish a competitive advantage within the 
environment. This definition combines common aspects from the pool of relevant works 
in an attempt to establish a single sentence definition that is easy to digest. To understand 
this definition, it is important to know what the ultimate purpose of strategic thinking is. 
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Strategic thinking is intended to enable and maintain an organization’s success76 or 
competitive advantage.77  Hence, the goal relies on predictive interpretations of the 
strategic environment to establish the advantage over competitors. Problem-solving slowly 
and linearly is not acceptable in a strategic environment characterized as complex, 
uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid; it requires problem-solving through continuous 
assessment, specifically from feedback, to learn and adapt to changes. Strategic thinking 
fills this requirement as it is an unstructured or non-linear thought process that continuously 
assesses the strategic environment and adapts to achieve desired outcomes.78  Strategic 
thinking also relies on both a holistic perspective to fully understand the problems that stem 
from the strategic environment, and creative or innovation solutions to address them.79  It 
is also important to understand a distinction provided by Dr. Spencer, who explains that 
strategic thinking is a decision-making process not relegated to a single level of war, i.e., 
the strategic level. This skill is applicable across every level of war. Thus, with strategic 
thinking defined, it is now of more use to understand the cognitive competencies associated 
with strategic thinking. 
B. COGNITIVE COMPETENCIES OF STRATEGIC THINKING 
An acceptable list of core competencies can be compiled by reviewing the literature 
of Yarger (2008), Waters (2011), McCauley (2016), Sackett et al. (2016), Young (2016), 
and Spencer (2018). As stated previously, most contemporary strategic thinking literature 
initially draws from Jeanne Liedtka to prescribe a framework of competencies necessary 
to become a strategic thinker, but the true influencer regarding military strategic thinking 
seems to be Yarger. A majority of this military focused literature agrees with four of 
Yarger’s competencies, thinking in time, systems thinking, critical thinking, and creative 
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thinking. All of the literature, except for that by McCauley, specifically list systems 
thinking as a necessary competency. However, McCauley does not completely exclude 
systems thinking as he describes it as a tool of critical thinking. Like systems thinking, 
critical thinking and creative thinking competencies are mentioned by all except Young, 
who omits critical thinking, and Sacket et al. who use innovative thinking interchangeably 
with creative thinking. From here the literature begins to diverge with various 
competencies, most of which seem to relate to a grouping provided by Sackett et al. as 
strategic thinking enablers, which “serve to support and translate strategic thinking.”80  
Such examples include Water’s self and cultural awareness; McCauley’s conceptual, 
communicative, and collaborative thinking; Sacket et al.’s knowledge and emotional 
regulation; Young’s intuition; and Spencer’s emotional intelligence. Of these additional 
competencies, Young’s intuition stands out as a key contributor to decision-making in the 
strategic environment, especially when time is not available or a decision must be made, 
and an optimal solution is not clear. Therefore, the five competencies of strategic thinking 
recognized for this research are thinking in time, systems thinking, critical thinking, 
creative thinking, and intuition. Given this, the sections that follow will describe each of 
these competencies. 
1. Systems Thinking 
Systems thinking involves understanding the whole ecosystem, more specifically, 
how the parts that comprise the system interact or influence each another.81  The strategic 
environment is an open system, meaning that its elements have external interactions, unlike 
a closed system where elements do not interact with the environment. To influence the 
strategic environment as desired, strategic thinkers must observe the environment as a 
system of systems, and understand the “interaction of components, the inter-relationships 
of the processes within the system, and the interconnections between systems across 
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time.”82  This competency is imperative for SF FGOs as they must understand the strategic 
environment to properly bound the problem they need to address and produce an 
appropriate solution with acceptable consequences. 
2. Thinking in Time 
Thinking in time involves having a historical perspective, applying knowledge of 
the past and present to produce desired outcomes in the future. As it relates to the purpose 
of strategic thinking, it answers “having seen the future that we want to create, what must 
we keep from our past, lose from the past, and create in our present, to get there?”83  
Drawing from the past and present enables the strategic thinker to recognize patterns, 
forecast opportunities, anticipate consequences, and provide a long-term perspective.84  As 
Spencer explains, “Nothing exists without roots. Therefore, decisions should be made 
within their proper historical context.”85 
3. Critical Thinking 
Critical thinking is simply about asking the right questions and challenging ideas 
or assumptions.86  These aspects play an important role, specifically when evaluating 
creative ideas or solutions. It also involves sorting through large quantities of information 
to identify what is relevant and not to a given situation and is essential to interpreting the 
strategic environment, defining the problem, identifying opportunity, and finding gaps in 
information. In today’s information age, critical thinking is ever more important as larger 
quantities of information are available that can overwhelm a decision-maker with irrelevant 
or misleading information and disrupt the decision-making process. 
                                                 
82 Leon Young, “Developing Strategic Thinking,” Australian Army Journal 13, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 
11, https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=673207695784363;res=IELAPA. 
83 Waters, “Understanding Strategic Thinking and Developing Strategic Thinkers,” 116. 
84 Sackett et al., “Enhancing the Strategic Capability of the Army,” 11. 
85 Spencer, Thinking for Impact, 19. 
86 Weyhrauch, “A Mindset for Strategic Thinking,” 16. 
28 
4. Creative Thinking 
Creative thinking is the development of innovative ideas, concepts, approaches, or 
ways of looking at a problem that avoids conventional thought.87  Like the aspect of 
challenging ideas and assumptions in critical thinking, creative thinking seeks to challenge 
the norm to produce unique solutions.88 This is a critical competency for SF, as they are 
expected to provide unique solutions to unconventional problems. Void of creative 
thinking, SF FGOs risk failing to meet their intended purpose. 
5. Intuitive Thinking 
Intuitive thinking is a non-sequential89 thought process of “instinctively and 
subconsciously drawing a conclusion without applying deduction or reasoning.”90  These 
conclusions are often referred to as a product of having a gut feeling. Young provides three 
variations of intuition. Holistic intuition makes judgments through a qualitative process, 
inferential intuition through automated analysis, or routine, and affective intuition through 
emotion.91  This competency has obvious flaws as it can bypass conscious reasoning and 
is vulnerable to emotion, but it can also be the deciding factor in situations where there is 
no clear best answer or time is not available. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Strategic thinking for SF FGOs can be achieved through five competencies: 
systems thinking, thinking in time, critical thinking, creative thinking, and Intuitive 
thinking. SF FGO success in the complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid strategic 
environment will depend on their abilities as strategic thinkers. They must understand the 
system of systems that encompass the environment and the interactions within it; apply 
knowledge of the past and present to see where they need to go in the future; use relevant 
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information to accurately identify the problem and challenge ideas and assumptions; avoid 
conventional thought and provide unique solutions to problems for which they are 
intended; and when necessary, have the confidence to apply intuition. SOF leaders have 
demonstrated these strategic thinking competencies throughout history and have succeeded 
in large part because of them. Strategic thinking is a timeless skill that should be 
emphasized during PME to best prepare SF FGOs for the challenges of the future. 
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V. STRATEGIC THINKING, A TIMELESS SKILL 
Strategic thinking by U.S. special operations (SOF) leaders have influenced success 
throughout modern military history. Strategic thinking enabled these SOF leaders to 
provide viable options for the U.S. government to deal with unexpected and emerging 
threats while seeking to maintain advantages in the strategic environment. Their strategic 
thinking resulted in favorable outcomes in times of peace and war, in training and real-
world operations, and through actions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. It is 
prudent for PME to emphasize the development of strategic thinking skills in SF FGOs. 
These skills will prepare them to meet strategic objectives and influence success in the 
strategic environment. This chapter provides case study analyses of special operations 
leaders from various periods in modern military history who influenced success. These 
leaders demonstrated the cognitive competencies discussed in Chapter IV that encompass 
strategic thinking:  systems thinking, thinking in time, critical thinking, creative thinking, 
and intuitive thinking. The case studies that follow will focus on each cognitive skill 
individually and discuss its impact towards influencing successful outcomes. This chapter 
is intended to highlight strategic thinking as a timeless and necessary skill when dealing 
with a complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid strategic environment. Its significance is 
further elevated for SF FGOs who are tasked to conduct special operations in this 
environment. 
A. SYSTEMS THINKING 
1. General Stanley McChrystal 
Systems thinking enabled General Stanley McChrystal to implement an effective 
counter-terrorism (CT) strategy through an understanding of the ecosystem that 
encompassed the CT fight with both Al-Qaida (AQ) and the Taliban (TB). With the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) still in its infancy in 2003, The Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) led by the newly appointed General McChrystal, established itself as 
the lead organization for CT. His assumption of command came at a time where he 
described JSOC “losing to a side [AQ and the TB] that lacked our resources and 
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professionalism.”92  JSOC could not keep pace with these adaptive enemies who did not 
focus on technology, operated in closed networks, and lived amongst the population.93  
Before developing a solution, McChrystal needed to understand the problem, the reason 
why JSOC was failing to keep up in the CT fight. Systems thinking allowed McChrystal 
to frame the problem and identify the root causes of failure. 
General McChrystal’s systems approach led to organizational restructuring and 
procedural changes that met the demands of a complex external environment and adaptive 
enemies. McChrystal started with a study of successes from JSOC’s history and found a 
common theme; the organization was much smaller before the GWOT. CT efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in increased operational requirements and the expansion of 
JSOC to meet them. As a larger organization, JSOC processes became slower, less 
effective, and declined in agility.94  McChrystal set out with this initial hypothesis as a lens 
through which to identify additional issues and develop solutions to address them. 
McChrystal understood the nature of CT ecosystem as a system of systems. This ecosystem 
involved a continuous cycle of interactions between a multitude of actors and 
environmental variables. The product of these interactions produced several outcomes 
which then provided feedbacks to the ecosystem. His initial priority was to understand how 
JSOC could interact better in the ecosystem. 
McChrystal’s initial focus on internal systems identified that JSOC’s 
communication and CT targeting processes were ineffective for what the ecosystem 
demanded. The current processes did not enable JSOC to effectively receive inputs, 
transform them into actions, and produce timely outputs. Regarding communications, this 
meant creating quicker channels for transferring information, so that timely decisions could 
be made before the enemy could adjust.95  McChrystal’s solution was to remove layers of 
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unnecessary bureaucracy and insufficient workspaces that hampered information flow.96  
The communications process also worked in hand with the CT targeting process, which 
before McChrystal’s arrival, was doctrinally aligned for large conventional warfare. The 
CT ecosystem was very fluid and filled with uncertainty, requiring a faster, more adaptive 
targeting process. The find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) targeting cycle was the 
innovative solution that fit these CT requirements and enabled JSOC to be proactive in the 
fight with AQ and TB. 
Systems thinking enabled JSOC to understand the interactions of all actors within 
the ecosystem better and decide what future interactions would lead to desired outcomes. 
With JSOC’s internal systems adjusted, McChrystal shifted focus to understanding AQ and 
TB organizational processes and how their interactions influenced the CT ecosystem. His 
analysis yielded a solution to increase JSOC’s effectiveness by refocusing efforts away 
from targeting low-level enemy fighters and instead applying them towards capturing or 
eliminating AQ and TB leadership.97  McChrystal understood that targeting low-level 
fighters or terrorist supporters also had some unintended consequences that potentially 
increased AQ and TB recruitment. However, a higher payoff result could be achieved by 
targeting vulnerabilities. Many of AQ and TB internal processes that made them effective 
were dependent on leadership; without them, their effectiveness suffered. JSOC 
organizational restructuring paired with a new CT strategy increased the effectiveness of 
U.S. CT efforts for years and led to the elimination of notable terrorist leaders such as Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi in 200698 and Osama Bin Laden in 2011.99  General McChrystal’s 
systems thinking had influences at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels with some 
still impacting JSOC’s organizational processes today, and U.S. CT strategy around the 
globe. 
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2. Guerrilla Warfare Strategy in the Philippines, 1942–1945 
CPTs Russel Volckmann and Donald Blackburn’s system thinking enabled them to 
understand the strategic ecosystem in the Pacific theater and implement solutions that 
achieved strategic effect. In early 1942, the U.S. was in desperate need of solutions to 
disrupt the Japanese advance and establish an advantage that would permit a 
counteroffensive. Working as intelligence officers in the 11th Infantry Regiment, 
Volckmann and Blackburn witnessed the U.S. forces withdrawal and the Philippine units 
fending for themselves behind enemy lines.100  The latter would provide part of the 
solution they envisioned for disrupting Japanese forces for years to come. Unwilling to 
surrender, Volckmann and Blackburn infiltrated the Philippine jungle behind Japanese 
lines to implement their solution under the banner of the United States Armed Forces in 
the Philippines – North Luzon (USAFIPNL).101 
An understanding of the interactions between actors in the ecosystem highlighted 
Japanese vulnerabilities and opportunities to exploit them. With U.S. forces withdrawing 
from the Philippines, Volkmann and Blackburn knew that disruption would need to come 
from resources organic to the island. They began by mapping out the strategic ecosystem 
in the Philippines; what the mapping identified was a military force that could be used to 
physically disrupt the Japanese and a population that could be recruited to provide auxiliary 
and underground support. These, in essence, would form the core of a guerrilla warfare 
strategy to counter the Japanese. The Philippine army units that were fighting to survive 
behind enemy lines were an optimal choice for a guerrilla force. They were already armed, 
trained, and combat-experienced fighters. Analysis of the interactions between the 
Japanese and local inhabitants produced a necessary element for successful guerrilla 
warfare, support. Ruthless behavior and atrocities committed by the Japanese on the 
population created conditions favorable for recruiting the population’s support for the 
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guerrilla forces; it was a chance for the population to fight back.102  Locals willingly 
provided material resources and information regarding Japanese forces. With the resources 
for guerrilla warfare identified, Volckmann and Blackburn sought to understand the 
implications and consequences of guerrilla actions and how they would affect the 
ecosystem in the Pacific. 
Systems thinking allowed Volkmann and Blackburn to project beyond the 
operational level and influence strategic outcomes. Their understanding of the Pacific 
theater strategic ecosystem highlighted the opportunity to disrupt the Japanese offensive 
through harassing operations in the Japanese rear echelons. The guerrilla warfare strategy 
would force the Japanese to maintain combat forces in the Philippines and reduce the 
amount sent forward to fight U.S. conventional forces in the island chains of the South 
Pacific.103  The success of this guerrilla strategy was reliant on an understanding of both 
the friendly conventional forces’ organizational processes and those of the enemy. This 
enabled Volkmann and Blackburn to manage their actions with the appropriate timing and 
coordination, thus producing desired outcomes and avoiding unintended consequences. If 
guerrilla actions were too damaging, it could induce the Japanese to revert to escalated 
ruthless actions against the population and destroy the guerrilla support network. They also 
transformed the organizational structure of the guerrilla forces to increase their 
effectiveness. Analysis of early decentralized guerrilla interactions with the Japanese 
proved to be inefficient and produced minimal effects. Volkmann and Blackburn unified 
the guerrilla forces under one command, which enabled them to synchronize efforts and 
effectively interact within the system. Ultimately, the guerrilla warfare strategy played a 
significant role in the Japanese surrender at Luzon. Their surrender to Blackburn revealed 
the effectiveness of the relatively small guerrilla force when General Mikami’s chief of 
staff recalled over 3,000 casualties inflicted on the Japanese by a guerrilla force they 
estimated to be 10,000 strong.104  In reality, the guerrilla’s numbered far less than this. 
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The U.S. forces’ ability to disrupt the Japanese in the Philippines without the commitment 
of large combat forces, and to establish favorable conditions for a counteroffensive, 
demonstrate the strategic impact of Volkmann and Blackburn’s strategic thinking. 
B. THINKING IN TIME 
1. Establishing a Permanent Unconventional Warfare Capability, 1952–
65 
The founding of Army Special Forces as a permanently established unconventional 
warfare capability and its early operational successes were due in large to leaders who 
thought in time. As discussed in Chapter III, the disbanding of the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) and the end of WWII left the U.S. military lacking an organization capable 
of unconventional warfare. In 1950 after the North Korean invasion of South Korea and as 
concern grew for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the Army Staff G3, Major General 
Charles Bolte assigned Brigadier General Robert A. McClure to head the newly created 
Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW).105  The OCPW’s mission was “to 
formulate and develop Psychological and Special Operations Plans for the Army…and to 
recommend policies for and supervise the execution of [Army] programs in those 
fields.”106  To fulfill the purpose of the OCPW, BG McClure organized it into three 
divisions, Psychological Warfare, Requirements, and Special Operations.107  Being that 
the initial focus for the unconventional warfare capability was the conduct of guerrilla 
warfare, significant attention was placed within the Special Operations division.108  This 
division would later establish Army Special Forces. BG McClure had vast experience in 
both psychological warfare and civil affairs from his time leading the Information and 
Censorship section of the Allied headquarters during WWII but lacked any guerrilla 
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warfare experience.109  To fill this gap, BG McClure sought officers to fill positions within 
the Special Operations division who had a history of unconventional warfare and more 
specifically, guerrilla warfare experience.110  The chosen officers brought expertise and a 
wealth of lessons learned from both WWII and the Korean War to shape and develop the 
plans that created SF.111  Most notable influences in this regard came from Colonel Aaron 
Bank who fought with the French resistance while assigned to the OSS and Colonel Russell 
Volkmann who organized and led guerrilla and special operations in the Philippines during 
WWII and the Korean War.112  With an understanding of the unconventional warfare 
capability needed, thinking in time provided the founders of SF with a historical 
perspective that drew from lessons learned and enabled SF to meet the demands of the 
current strategic environment and posture itself to maintain the future advantage. 
Historical perspectives continued to impact SF beyond those of the organizational 
founders as early cadre shaped SF’s future. The initial cadres tasked to develop the lesson 
plans, and programs of instruction for SF training also drew on past experiences and lessons 
learned that still influence SF today. Prior OSS experienced cadre like First Lieutenant 
Caesar Civitella,  Captain Leif Bangsboll, CPT John Hemingway, Lieutenant Colonel 
James Goodwin, and LTC Winston Ehrgott influenced the core of SF training through a 
history of work in guerrilla warfare, senior liaison, foreign culture and language, 
unconventional warfare instruction, and escape and evasion.113  In 1961, President 
Kennedy’s description of the Cold War-era strategic environment placed even more 
emphasis on unconventional warfare and the demand for SF. As the newly appointed 
commander of U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, Brigadier General Yarborough sought 
to refine SF training further to deal with counter-insurgency.114  The counter-insurgency 
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training he envisioned drew from a combination of personal experience, guerrilla warfare 
experts, and his study of Mao Tse-Tung, Truong Chinh, and Vo Nguyen Giap.115 
Thinking in time enabled SF organizational learning through the application of 
lessons learned. Yarborough’s inspired training paid off first in Laos with some of the 
earliest SF operational detachments tasked to conduct counter-insurgency by training the 
Royal Laotian Army to counter the Communist Pathet Leo. In Vietnam, early successes 
came through SF detachments working with the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) 
and training of Ranger units of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN).116  In many ways, SF cut 
its teeth in the Vietnam War through years of combat lessons, and when these lessons were 
applied, they enabled SF to remain adaptive. The 1962 Laotian declaration of neutrality 
brought an end to U.S. operations in Laos and allowed the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
to logistical support the Viet Cong freely along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.117  Early efforts by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to re-establish intelligence in Laos along the trail 
through project LEAPING LENA failed. With the need to regain this critical intelligence, 
Colonel Donald Blackburn, commander of the newly established Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG), was tasked to conduct 
clandestine operations into Laos under operation SHINING BRASS.118  COL Blackburn 
drew lessons from the failed LEAPING LENA project and applied them to SHINING 
BRASS which resulted in a re-established intelligence network that included Laos, 
Cambodia, and North Vietnam.119 
2. First Village Stability Operation, Afghanistan 2009 
SOF leaders developed a concept that met strategic intent through the influence of 
a historical perspective. After almost a decade in Afghanistan, the U.S. military shifted to 
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a counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. The focus for SF COIN was to bolster the 
legitimacy of the Afghan government at the village level in hopes of garnering the 
population’s support. To achieve this, SOF command elements in theater envisioned a 
concept inspired by SF efforts in Vietnam. Their concept was a bottom-up approach that 
involved embedding SF ODAs in strategically valuable villages that had a history of 
resisting the Taliban.120  There, ODAs would establish a security bubble and governance 
at the local level, which would then be linked with other established villages to form stable 
regions.121  The VSO concept drew from SF’s history with organizing and training the 
CIDG and the Strategic Hamlet Program, in fact; the Shape, Hold, Build, and Transition 
phases of VSO closely mirror those of the Strategic Hamlet Program.122  Lessons learned 
from SF’s history of working similar efforts in Vietnam set conditions for the VSO concept 
in Afghanistan. 
Thinking in time enabled ODA 7224 to succeed by using historical concepts and 
applying them within the appropriate context for their mission; their success paved the way 
for future village stability operations (VSO) in Afghanistan. In April 2009 ODA 7224 
received a change of mission, instead of conducting kill or capture direct action operations, 
they would be the first team to lead VSO in Afghanistan.123  Time was not a luxury as the 
change of mission to prepare for VSO came at the end of their pre-mission training; the 
ODA prioritized their efforts and focused on research.124  As Dr. Spencer explained, 
“nothing exists without roots,”125 and ODA 7224 knew that to best understand their 
mission and the operational environment, they would need to study the regional Afghan 
history and learn from historical SF cases involving similar missions.126  Information 
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gathered from research aided the detachments planning, specifically regarding mission 
analysis, which provided the initial blueprints for establishing security, building trust and 
relationships with locals, and ultimately bolstering the legitimacy of the Afghan 
government. The detachments study of Afghan history developed cultural astuteness, 
which facilitated trusting relationships with the villagers through projects that improved 
significant infrastructures such as a mosque, schools, and medical clinics.127  Regarding 
security, the ODA used their own past experiences organizing and training Afghans to 
establish a small Afghan Local Police (ALP) element.128  By the end of their deployment, 
the ODA’s VSO efforts had established professional relationships with the residents of the 
village, expelled enemy forces from the province, improved economic well-being through 
trade with neighboring districts, and ultimately improved the security situation in the 
province from a non-permissive to a semi-permissive environment.129  Thinking in time 
did not stop with ODA 7224 as they set conditions for future ODAs to pull from their 
experience leading VSO and apply them to their mission. 
Thinking in time continued after ODA 7224’s departure from Afghanistan as follow 
on ODAs tasked to lead VSO, and the SOF headquarters that supported them, drew from 
ODA 7224’s experiences and lessons learned. Their experiences, observations, analysis, 
and recommendations were captured in detailed reports to the SOF headquarters and 
distributed to follow on ODAs tasked to lead VSO.130  ODA 7224’s key recommendation 
for follow on ODAs was to develop a historical perspective through the study of local 
Afghan history.131  Ultimately, the ODA’s experiences became historical references for 
future operations while their lessons learned, and recommendations fed into a feedback 
loop that promoted organizational learning and adaptiveness. ODA 7224’s deliberate study 
of SF and Afghan history enabled the detachment to learn from past experiences and avoid 
costly mistakes. 
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C. CRITICAL THINKING: 
1. Operation KINGPIN, Vietnam 1970 
Critical thinking by the planners and leaders of Operation KINGPIN resulted in a 
near perfectly executed raid on Son Tay. The SF raid to rescue American prisoners of war 
(POW) codenamed Operation KINGPIN, is often remembered as either a failure to rescue 
POWs or as a model of tactical excellence. As Admiral McRaven (retired) explained, the 
unforeseeable variables that resulted in the failure to rescue POWs, “were not a result of 
faulty planning, preparation, or execution and can only be attributed to the frictions of 
war.”132  The successful execution of this surgical operation during a period of increased 
political sensitivity in the Vietnam War can be attributed to the influence of critical 
thinking by special operations leaders. 
In 1970, the risk and sensitivity of Operation KINGPIN escalated with concerns 
that American POW rescue operations could compromise President Nixon’s diplomatic 
efforts for POW release, further justifying the requirement for critical thinking.133  
Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, serving as the special assistant for counterinsurgency 
and special activities (SACSA) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was charged with 
primary responsibility of leading a Joint Contingency Task Group (JCGF) effort to rescue 
POWs after aerial reconnaissance photos revealed the presence of POWs at Camp Hope 
near Son Tay.134  BG Blackburn’s critical thinking began with the receipt of the mission 
as he immediately requested further reconnaissance missions that later confirmed the 
presence of individuals at the camp.135  To avoid premature commitment to a rescue 
operation based only on initial information, Blackburn recommended an in-depth 
feasibility assessment which was approved and later conducted by a twelve-man study 
group that represented all three services.136  The diversity of this planning team does more 
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than to showcase the integration of experts from the three services who would execute the 
operation; rather it highlights the varying perspectives each service brought to planning 
that could overcome biases and challenge assumptions through critical thinking. 
BG Leroy Manor, commander of the Rescue operation, and his deputy commander 
Colonel Arthur “Bull” Simmons understood implications and consequences throughout the 
planning and training for the operation that ensured the best chance for mission success. 
Understanding the implications and consequences of actions is a significant aspect of 
critical thinking, specifically when seeking to maintain an advantage.137  To eliminate the 
probability of compromise to the mission and maintain the advantage of secrecy, they took 
actions to ensure operational security (OPSEC) amongst those who would execute the 
operation and when coordinating for outside support. A cover and deception plan was 
developed for the training and deployment phases and a counterintelligence plan to 
safeguard against threats to the mission.138   
With authority to request and receive whatever resources they needed, Blackburn, 
Manor, and Simmons applied critical thought to manage and sift through a plethora of 
information regarding the camp at Son Tay and available friendly capabilities. Critical 
thinking enabled them to develop a simple yet flexible ground tactical plan that could be 
easily understood and executed by the raiders, and then shift attention and effort to more 
complex issues surrounding the operation like penetrating North Vietnamese territory 
undetected.139  The solution to this problem came about as a result of their determination 
to challenge information and ask further questions. Aware of two radars that could impede 
clandestine infiltration, Blackburn directed his questions to Milt Zaslov from the NSA. 
Within a week, Zaslov’s analysis discovered a coverage gap between the radars, a five-
minute gap that the operators would eventually exploit to infiltrate undetected.140 
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The Son Tay raiders took nothing for granted, remained adaptive, and avoided 
catastrophic failure by challenging assumption and preparing for contingencies. The 
planners and raiders challenged assumptions during the planning and training phases by 
asking the right questions. Rather than assume complete compliance of the POWs during 
the rescue operation, planners drew from returning POW testimonies to predict the mental 
and physical status to be expected.141  The same theme was applied to the tactical portion 
of the raid by Lieutenant Colonel Bud Sydnor, who developed the training curriculum, 
supervised rehearsals, and led the ground force at the POW camp.142  The curriculum and 
rehearsals were instrumental to the successful execution of the operation as they provided 
opportunities to challenge hypotheses, resulting in the development of alternate action 
plans and new tactics and procedures, specifically regarding the Air Force elements.143  
The impact of these efforts is best illustrated by the ground forces execution of the alternate 
“Plan Green” after Col. Simmons’ element mistakenly landed at a neighboring compound 
instead of the intended camp.144  The contingency action plan ensured a seamless transition 
on the objective between ground elements to mutually support each other and fill gaps, 
resulting in the elimination of several enemies and zero loss of life to the raiders. Although 
rescued POWs were not an outcome of Operation KINGPIN, the critical thought applied 
by the planners and raiders serves as an example to be emulated by future SF leaders.  
2. Wadi Al Khirr Airfield, Iraq 2003 
Critical thinking enabled planners to successfully establish a desert landing strip 
for SOF elements to conduct deep infiltration operations in support of the conventional 
forces’ invasion of Iraq. Part of U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) intent for SF was 
to conduct special reconnaissance of strategically important objectives before the 
conventional forces’ advance. Reconnaissance of objectives deep in Iraqi held territory 
required the establishment of a desert landing strip south of Baghdad in the vicinity of the 
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Karbala-Najaf area.145  Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) 570 was tasked with 
establishing an advanced operating base (AOB) at the proposed desert landing strip which 
it would need to operate for up to 48 hours.146  Under a time and resource-constrained 
environment, ODB 570 applied critical thinking to plan and execute a seamless operation.  
ODB 570 challenged assumptions and concepts to produce the optimal solution for 
their mission. Critical thought began early in the planning phase as the Air Force combat 
control team attached to the ODB searched through maps and imagery to find a suitable 
landing strip. Drawing experience from Afghanistan, the combat controllers new that 
remote desert landing strips were not suitable for sustained landings, so they searched for 
existing hard surface landing strips.147  Unfortunately, U.S. bombing campaigns during 
Operation DESERT STORM left most cratered and inoperable.148 The combat controllers, 
however, challenged the assumption that there would be no suitable existing landing strips 
and discovered that the abandoned Wadi Al Khirr fighter base could be the answer.149   
Critical thinking during concept development enabled ODB 570 to develop a 
feasible and adaptive course of action to accomplish their mission. With a potential airfield 
selected, they planned for infiltration. Given the High altitude-low opening (HALO) 
capability of the combat controllers and the ODA attached to the ODB, an obvious option 
was a parachute infiltration.150  Again, the ODB challenged assumptions and navigated 
potential bias towards a specific capability, especially one such as HALO that can be 
viewed as sexy or something out of the movies. Instead, the ODB analyzed available 
infiltration methods to select the optimal one. Drawing on historical lessons learned from 
DESERT STORM, the ODB opted out of a HALO infiltration due to the disadvantages 
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associated with the compromise of a dismounted element in a desert environment.151  
Ultimately, ODB 570 decided on using MH-53J helicopters which could transport 
nonstandard and all-terrain ground mobility vehicles.152  The ODB was also aware of the 
consequences and implications of the planned operation, drawing lessons learned from 
similar aspects of operations like EAGLE CLAW, the failed rescue of American hostages 
in Iran.153  They challenged multiple scenarios to establish contingency plans. These plans 
included an alternate landing strip should Wadi Al Khirr be unusable. The ODB cross-
loaded critical personnel amongst the aircraft to ensure the mission could continue in the 
event of a lost aircraft.154  During the operation, critical thinking contributed to the ODB’s 
problem solving by challenging conventional thought and producing creative solutions to 
remove dirt mounds off the runway at Wadi Al Khirr. Under time constraints to have the 
runway operational, the ODB knew that shovels would not accomplish the task in time. 
Their creative solution involved a scavenged piece of metal siding from the old airbase tied 
to an all-terrain vehicle which they used to smooth out the dirt mounds on the runway.155  
From the established clandestine airfield, follow on ODAs launched deep infiltration 
reconnaissance missions ahead of the advancing conventional forces. ODB 570’s critical 
thinking produced a feasible plan and enabled adaptiveness that resulted in a seamless 
operation. 
D. CREATIVE THINKING 
1. The Doolittle Raid, Japan 1942 
Creative thinking enabled the leaders of the Doolittle Raid to overcome capability 
disadvantages and conduct a deep penetration special operation on the Japanese mainland. 
Immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. was in desperate need 
of a military victory. Unfortunately for the U.S., defeats at the hands of the Japanese 
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continued through the spring of 1942. These defeats included the unconditional surrender 
or full retreat of Allied forces in Burma, Singapore, Java, and the notable battle at Bataan 
in the Philippines, which resulted in the Bataan Death March.156  Japan seemed to be an 
unfathomable enemy as they continued to advance through an unrelenting offensive. 
Seeking to gain the initiative and establish a strategic advantage, the U.S. military turned 
to the U.S. Army Air Corps for a solution. 
The innovative solution to influence the strategic environment with a raid on the 
Japanese mainland was inspired through the creative thinking of the Doolittle Raid 
planners and leaders. In full retrograde and with no forward airbases in range of Japan, the 
U.S.’s ability to target the Japanese mainland seemed impossible. The use of highly valued 
aircraft carriers to launch short-range aircraft was also eliminated due to the risk the carriers 
incurred if staged within range of Japanese mainland defenses. A member of the Chief of 
Navy Admiral King’s staff, Captain Francis S. Low, was aware of this capability gap and 
the importance of a solution to the problem. For this, Captain Low reached back in history 
to reference previous observations he made of bombers performing short runway takeoffs 
and landings.157  His subsequent challenging of conventional thought produced a creative 
concept that involved the unthinkable use of U.S. Army Air Corps twin-engine bombers 
from U.S. Navy carriers to conduct a raid on the Japanese mainland.158 
LTC James H. Doolittle’s creative thinking during mission planning filled the gaps 
created by the challenging of assumptions and hypotheses. Doolittle held a Ph.D. in 
aeronautical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and had 
established himself as an innovative pioneer of instrument flying techniques, as he was the 
first pilot to conduct a blind flight.159  He was a proven creative thinker fit for the challenge 
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of leading the planning effort for the raid, specifically to launch long-range bombers from 
aircraft carriers. One of his early challenges revolved around the bombers inability to take 
off within the allotted distance due to excess weight. Doolittle’s creativity worked in unison 
with critical thought to identify a solution that lowered aircraft weight by reducing non-
essential equipment and portions of the aircraft’s frame. One such recommendation that 
challenged conventional thought was the removal of the rear and lower aft guns as they 
would be ineffective at the low flying altitudes of the mission, which freed up more space 
and allowed for additional fuel to be carried. As a deterrent, black painted broom handles 
were creatively fashioned as replacements.160  Additional creative adjustments were made 
to the aircraft to increase fuel efficiency and performance.161  With the base aircraft 
configuration established, the pilots and crews began training at Eglin Airbase, the future 
home of the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command. The training that ensued 
witnessed relentless critical thinking and the resultant creative solutions that ultimately 
produced the final plan for the Doolittle Raid. The Raid itself produced little material 
damage to the Japanese, but the unexpectedness of the unconventional raid left a 
psychological impact that would shape future Japanese strategy.162  This special operation 
had a strategic effect as it set favorable conditions for future U.S. operations in the Pacific 
theater by forcing the Japanese to place emphasis on protection and commit valuable naval 
and air forces to the mainland. It also induced Japanese fear regarding the U.S. aircraft 
carrier, causing tactical mistakes on the part of the Japanese during decisive battles such as 
Midway.163  The creative thinking of planners and leaders of the Doolittle Raid produced 
an unconventional solution that resulted in high strategic payoff and influenced outcomes 
in the Pacific theater. 
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2. Infiltrating Afghanistan, Afghanistan 2001 
Special Operations creative thinking produced an unconventional solution that 
enabled successful infiltration of SOF elements into Afghanistan. The operational 
environment in the early stages of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was ripe with demand 
for creativity, and SOF were the chosen ones to lead the unconventional warfare campaign 
to oust the Taliban. After producing only minimal impacts through early overt direct-
actions in southern Afghanistan, SOF commanders realized that they would need to be 
more creative to achieve desired outcomes.164  These early overt efforts also had some 
unintended consequences as they prematurely increased the U.S. operational signature and 
alerted the Taliban of U.S. efforts. A lack of friendly forces available to aid SOF, who were 
relatively unfamiliar with the operational environment, only added to the variables 
distancing U.S. forces from establishing an advantage.165  To meet the intent of the 
campaign and oust the Taliban, SOF required the ability to collect information that could 
be analyzed to produce battlefield intelligence and drive operations. Faced with early 
unfavorable conditions, SOF met the challenge and developed a creative solution to 
infiltrate Taliban held territory and produce critical intelligence that supported the 
unconventional warfare campaign. 
SOF creative thinking facilitated the decision to employ a deception operation that 
created opportunities and set conditions for successful SOF infiltrations deep into Taliban 
held territory. With little early intelligence to work with, SOF quickly found themselves 
operating in the dark. Pete Blaber, commander of a top tier SOF unit, was tasked with 
bringing light to the situation by conducting intelligence collection operations or as he put 
it “taking action to make action.” 166  Along with the threat imposed by the enemy, a lack 
of operational experience with conducting deep infiltration intelligence collection missions 
only increased the risk. Blaber’s unit began mission planning with the understanding that 
the likelihood of success would depend in part on reducing this risk; the solution lay within 
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the creative minds of the planners. In less than 24 hours, they concluded that a military 
deception operation could mitigate the enemy threat and allow SOF elements to infiltrate 
Taliban territory by reducing “the enemy’s awareness.”167  The concept for this operation 
strayed far from conventional thought and instead, relied on creativity to deceive the 
Taliban. The team of SOF planners believed that a false parachute infiltration at multiple 
drop zones scattered throughout the Taliban territory would distract the enemy’s focus and 
enable true SOF insertions. The creative genius was in the details of making the fake 
paratroopers seem real to the enemy, thus providing a longer-lasting deceptive result. The 
solution, to fashion large blocks of ice to parachutes that would drop at night and eventually 
melt after landing, making the remnant harnesses seem hurriedly left behind by 
paratroopers. Resupply parachute drops would follow to add realism and convince the 
enemy that the force was large.168  Captured enemy journals described the paranoia and 
concern regarding the “American Commandos” and verified the effect of the SOF 
deception operation.169  With Taliban combat power pulled away from strong point 
locations, the SOF reconnaissance was able to infiltrate Taliban territory and conduct 
intelligence collection operations. This intel would later feed offensive SOF operations and 
contribute to the toppling of the Taliban Regime. 
E. INTUITIVE THINKING 
1. Montagnard Uprising, Vietnam 1964 
The decisive actions of Special Forces Team A-312 that disrupted the 1964 
Montagnard uprising are attributable to intuitive thinking. The operational environment in 
Vietnam during this period was nothing short of complex as it witnessed according to, 
political conspiracies; attempted military coups; and Buddhist, Catholic, student, and labor 
demonstrations and protests.”170  Team A-312 along with four other SF teams were 
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deployed to Vietnam to train, advise, and lead Montagnards against the Vietcong (VC) and 
Viet Montagnard Cong (VMC) in the Darlac province of the central highlands region.171  
Located at separate bases in the region, the teams lived and operated with a contingent of 
Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) and the Montagnards who comprised the Civilian 
Irregular Defense Group (CIDG).172  Despite the working relationship, the complexities 
of the operational environment were at play even in the bases between the LLDB and the 
ethnic minority Montagnards. The specific complexity stemmed from the United Front for 
the Liberation of the Oppressed Races (FULRO), a Montagnard organization, who planned 
and organized an uprising against the South Vietnamese government.173  Their plan for an 
uprising included the seizure of the central highland city of Ban Me Thuot through an 
organized assault utilizing Montagnard forces from the surrounding bases.174  The 
synchronized actions by Montagnards at each camp would be critical for the successful 
seizure of Ban Me Thuot. Team A-312’s intuition would contribute to the disruption of this 
plan. 
Team A-312’s quick, intuitive thinking enabled them to make good decision to 
diffuse the situation at their Buon Brieng base camp and disrupt the intended outcome of 
the Montagnard Uprising. Relationships between the SF teams, the LLDB, and 
Montagnards were different at each camp, in Team A-312’s case, the relationships were 
good between all three. The SF team built a strong bond with the Montagnards through 
training and partnered combat operations.175  It is undeniable that this relationship 
contributed to Team A-312’s ability to diffuse the situation, but it was their intuitive 
thinking that had significant impacts in critical moments. 
Subconsciously armed with information from months of working with the 
Montagnards, A-312 had an intuition that something was not right. As team member SGT 
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Bleacher explained, “leading up to the uprising there was something going on, but we 
couldn’t put our finger on it.”176  Passive questions made by the Montagnards to see who 
the SF team would side within a fight between the LLDB and CIDG added to their 
suspicion.177  A-312 trusted their intuition strongly enough to radio concerns to their SF 
headquarters and followed up with personal visits, but it was not until later that those 
concerns would become a reality.178  On 19 September 1964, A-312 received a warning 
from their SF headquarters to expect peaceful Montagnard demonstrations and was later 
assured by the CIDG commander that it would not be a problem at their camp.179  
Reverting to their intuition, the team challenged the assumption that all would be fine in 
the camp and prepared for contingencies. The team decided that control over the 
ammunition and denial of vehicles could disrupt possible Montagnard actions against the 
camp.180  The next day A-312 was alerted by their headquarters that the other SF camps 
were having problems with the CIDG, the uprising had begun. SF teams at the other camps 
were disarmed and the LLDB and Vietnamese within the camps killed or imprisoned.181  
Intuition informed by subconscious historical reference of Montagnard culture and appeal 
to authority figures, led Team A-312’s detachment commander to boldly inform the LLDB 
and CIDG commanders that he was assuming command of all forces at Buon Brieng and 
that no attempts would be made against the Vietnamese as they were under his 
protection.182  Simultaneously, the remainder of the team enacted their plan to disrupt a 
possible Montagnard camp seizure by taking control of key weapon systems and disabling 
the vehicles in the motor pool.183  With Buon Brieng under control, the SF headquarters 
requested Captain Vernon Gillespie, detachment commander of A-312, to help with the 
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hostile negotiations with CIDG at a village just southwest of Ban Me Thuot, Buon M-
Bre.184  During tense negotiations with the CIDG, a truck entered the village with captured 
Vietnamese soldiers. Gillespie decisively acted on affective intuition to defuse the situation 
as he recounted “I felt it was necessary to show in some small way that these men were 
under the protection of the U.S. to keep them from being killed…This act seemed to have 
an effect as no further move was made against the Vietnamese.”185  To increase leverage 
for the SF teams, Gillespie also informed the CIDG that non-compliance would result in 
the withdrawal of future SF support.186  Ultimately, the actions of A-312 disrupted the 
Montagnard Uprising as FULRO was unable to follow through with synchronized seizure 
of the base camps and subsequent seizure of Ban Me Thuot. Team A-312 established the 
advantage through intuition that inspired critical thinking to stay ahead of the 
Montagnard’s actions, and while also facilitating the right decisive action in critical 
moments. 
F. FAILURES TO EMPLOY STRATEGIC THINKING 
The implications for not applying strategic thinking are significant, as they can lead 
to unintended outcomes that detract from achieving U.S. strategic objectives. A lack of 
strategic thinking contributed to failures in some past special operations. While not 
attributed to the actions of a single person, shortcomings in the planning for both operations 
Eagle Claw 1980 and the Battle of Mogadishu 1993, reveal the absence or rejection of 
multiple strategic thinking cognitive competencies. 
1. Operation EAGLE CLAW, Iran 1980 
Failures in the application of strategic thinking by SOF planners contributed to the 
unintended outcomes of operation EAGLE CLAW. The 1970s saw an escalation in 
terrorism in various parts of the world, adding more complexity to the strategic 
environment. The escalation led countries like the United Kingdom and the U.S. to 
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establish military capabilities specifically for countering terrorism. The U.S.’s counter-
terrorism force conducted its first operation following the Iranian revolution, which placed 
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in power as the leader of the newly established 
Islamic Republic.187  U.S. diplomacy with Iran continued to weaken in the wake of the 
revolution, causing the U.S. Embassy to scale down in size. Tensions culminated on 
November 4, 1979, with the seizure of the U.S. Embassy by student supporters of the 
Iranian Revolution.188  Months of failed diplomatic efforts to release more than 50 
hostages held at the embassy led to a military rescue operation, EAGLE CLAW.189   A 
lack of strategic thinking led to planning failures that contributed to the mission being 
aborted.  
To begin with, a lack of a systems approach resulted in planning efforts that reduced 
thinking in time. The outcome of operation EAGLE CLAW has been described by many 
as a disaster. The intended surprise operations fell victim to multiple aircraft malfunctions 
and ended with a decision to abort the rescue attempt after an RH-53 helicopter collided 
with a grounded EC-130 airplane.190  Several systemic variables impacted the outcome of 
the operation. Variables in the external environment combined with the different 
organizational processes of the various services who participated in EAGLE CLAW 
contributed to the collision at the desert landing site, DESERT ONE. The failure to 
understand the strategic ecosystem led planners to inadequately account for historical 
information regarding the environment like the occurrence of sandstorms known as 
haboobs, an environmental variable that affected pilots throughout the operation. Reduced 
visibility caused by the sandstorms increased the difficulty of navigating to DESERT ONE 
and created an illusion for the RH-53 that resulted in a piloting error. Without historical 
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references and lessons learned for flying in such conditions, the pilots were left 
unprepared.191 
EAGLE CLAW planners’ critical thinking was restricted without a systems 
perspective. They neglected to challenge some key assumptions, the most significant being 
the interoperability between military elements involved in the operation.192193  EAGLE 
CLAW included pilots and aircraft from both the Air Force and Marine Corps, each with 
their standard operating procedures. The mostly segregated training and rehearsals 
conducted by each service, use of training aircraft that differed from those planned for the 
operation, and inexperienced pilots, demonstrate how planners neglected to account for the 
friendly forces system.194   More specifically, they did not assess the internal 
organizational structure and processes to identify how all the elements could effectively 
interact tactically in the system. Inadequate communications systems reduced the flow of 
information and further hampered critical thinking. Simultaneous efforts were conducted 
by various military and interagency organizations to gather information for the rescue 
attempt; however, the intelligence they produced was ineffective due to a lack of 
dissemination.195  Concerns over operational security also contributed to the reduced 
effectiveness of the communication system as information was further compartmentalized. 
Compartmentalization even caused weather information concerning the sandstorms not to 
be passed from meteorologists to the pilots.196  Challenging the bias toward an assumption 
of seamless execution could have highlighted potential friction points and provided 
necessary contingencies—contingencies that accounted for system variables such as 
weather, enemy threats, and downed aircraft. In the end, EAGLE CLAW failed to rescue 
the hostages and resulted in the death of eight service members. The strategic consequences 
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of the operation contributed to weak U.S. diplomatic relations with Iran for years, 
weakened domestic trust in U.S. capability, and provided Iran with leverage during hostage 
negotiations. Strategic thinking may have led planners to identify possible failure points 
and address them before mission execution. 
2. Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia 1993 
The absence of strategic thinking led SOF leaders to execute a mediocrely planned 
operation in Somalia, resulting in undesirable outcomes. In 1992, opposing Somali factions 
agreed to a ceasefire after more than a decade of civil war, creating an opportunity for the 
United Nations (U.N.) intervention.197  The U.S. led the subsequent U.N. peacekeeping 
effort under Operation RESTORE HOPE, which was to protect humanitarian assistance 
and peace-enforcement operations.198  Despite the peacekeeping mission’s early success, 
threats to instability grew as warlord Muhammed Farah Aideed’s faction commenced 
harassing attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, to include a bombing that killed four U.S. 
soldiers.199  The increased security threat gave way to a SOF led mission, Operation 
GOTHIC SERPENT, to eliminate the threat to peacekeepers by targeting Muhammed 
Farah Aideed’s faction.200  A lack of strategic thinking by this SOF task force resulted in 
unintended consequences for U.S. foreign policy in East Africa. 
By not challenging assumptions, the SOF task force was unable to apply critical 
thinking. By October 1993, the SOF task force had conducted six raids against Aideed’s 
faction, half of which had been executed in daylight and with relative ease.201  More than 
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35 other operations were planned and canceled as well during this period.202  After a lull 
in operations, intelligence reports surfaced of a potential meeting between Aideed’s 
Lieutenants; the task force planned a raid to capture them in the Bakara Market.203  The 
task force neglected to challenge the assumption that a daytime operation in the unfamiliar 
Bakara Market would provide the same favorable outcomes witnessed on previous daytime 
raids. The planners of the operation also bypassed a lack of intelligence regarding the threat 
in the vicinity of the Bakara Market, which led to an underestimation of the enemy’s 
capability. Critical thinking applied during mission analysis may have revealed gaps in 
intelligence that needed to be answered to reduce risk and increase the chance of mission 
success. Thinking in time may also have contributed to the identification of the enemy’s 
capability to counter U.S. rotary-wing aircraft, as a conventional force Blackhawk 
helicopter had been shot down a week before the Bakara Market operation.204  Critical 
thinking may have also revealed the need to delay the operation until adequate intelligence 
and favorable conditions emerged. Without critical thinking, the SOF headquarters went 
forward with a less than optimal solution. 
The SOF task force overvalued the Bakara Market operation and lost sight of its 
potential strategic implications. Lacking optimal conditions for a raid, the task force 
executed the operation in the Bakara Market on October 3, 1993.205  Although successful 
in capturing the Lieutenants, the cost to the U.S. was high. The raid originally projected to 
last less than an hour, went on for fourteen and shifted from a raid to a rescue operation 
following the loss of two Blackhawk helicopters shot down by enemy fire. The operation, 
now commonly known as the Battle of Mogadishu, left 18 service members killed in action, 
84 wounded, and one pilot captured and later released.206  The strategic implications were 
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witnessed in the wake of the costly operation as political sensitivity toward U.S. efforts in 
Somalia amplified and culminated with the withdrawal of military forces in March 
1994.207  A year later, the peacekeeping effort had dissolved with the subsequent 
withdrawal of U.N. forces in March of 1995.208  Planning efforts void of strategic thinking 
resulted in an inaccurate conclusion of the benefits of conducting a high-risk special 
operation that ultimately overshadowed the strategic intent of U.S. efforts in Somalia and 
influenced unintended outcomes. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Strategic thinking is a timeless decision-making skill with proven value for adaptive 
problem-solving in complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid environments. It has enabled 
SOF leaders to understand the strategic environment as a system by breaking down its parts 
to identify root problems. These leaders have thought in time to inform decision-making 
and shape solutions using lessons from the past. Through critical thinking, they have 
challenged assumptions and overcome biases, which often inspired creative thinking and 
produced innovative solutions. Aware of their intuitions, these leaders have made good 
decisions in critical situations, especially when the time to think and act was limited. SOF 
leaders have influenced success throughout modern military history because of these 
cognitive abilities. Although technology and tactics are important, their relevance is fluid 
and changes with the environment. As such, the emphasis for SF FGOs during PME should 
be to develop lasting skills. Systems thinking, thinking in time, critical thinking, creative 
thinking, and intuitive thinking were as relevant for SOF leaders in WWII as they are for 
leaders today and of the future. Development of these cognitive competencies will arm SF 
FGOs with strategic thinking, and best prepare them to influence strategic outcomes that 
meet U.S. objectives. 
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VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
Professional military education (PME) can prepare Army Special Forces (SF) field 
grade officers (FGO) to influence successful outcomes and meet the nation’s strategic 
objectives by developing their strategic thinking skills. SF FGOs are expected to provide 
unique solutions to address problems in an unconventional strategic environment that is 
complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid. Their ability to make good decisions in this 
environment is critical, as their actions can have strategic consequences. Although factors 
such as technology and tactics have changed over time, the skill of strategic thinking has 
not. Through out modern military history SOF leaders have demonstrated the timelessness 
and impact of strategic thinking by using it to influence success in their strategic 
environment. A PME plan tailored for SF FGOs that emphasizes the development of 
strategic thinking will arm them with the adaptive problem-solving required to influence 
success in the current strategic environment and the future. This chapter will conclude the 
research by providing a summary of the key points discussed in the previous chapters and 
recommendations for future research aligned towards solution development and 
implementation. 
A. PME ILE ISSUES 
The current PME is not tailored to meet requirements specific to SF FGOs, 
especially during intermediate level education (ILE). The U.S. Department of Defense, 
senior military leaders, and academics have identified deficiencies with PME. Secretary of 
Defense Mattis declared in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) that “PME has 
stagnated”209 while retired Brigadier General and current academic contributor for the 
RAND Corporation, Paula Thornhill, asserted that the military service schools “fail to 
produce the officers their services need.”210  More narrow criticism of PME identifies the 
educational output as the key deficiency as officers learn what to think instead of how to 
think. Although this criticism is all-encompassing for PME, leaders within the special 
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operations community have also highlighted the demand for thinking skills. In a 2016 co-
authored article titled Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone, senior SOF leaders 
General Joseph Votel, former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and 
Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, former Commander of U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command, emphasize that SOF leaders who can apply critical and creative 
thinking with limited guidance are the most in-demand for Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
in the future strategic environment.211  Strategic thinking fills this demand by producing 
SF FGOs who know not only how to think, but are adaptive problem-solvers capable of 
conducting critical UW tasks in the strategic environment. 
B. WHY SPECIAL FORCES NEEDS STRATEGIC THINKING 
Complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, and fluidity will continue to define the 
strategic environment of the future and increase the demand for SF who can provide 
unconventional solutions to unconventional problems. State and non-state actors will 
continue to seek influence in the strategic environment while avoiding a threshold that 
incites war by employing unconventional warfare.212  Russian intervention in Ukraine, 
Iranian special operations in the middle east, and Chinese cyber operations demonstrate the 
likely future reliance on unconventional warfare as the means to achieve strategic 
objectives. U.S. efforts to counter its adversaries’ unconventional warfare will not be 
absent of higher levels of risk as they are likely to occur in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive areas where they can have strategic implications.213  As such, the demand will 
increase for SF FGOs who can navigate these unconventional challenges and influence 
success at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Strategic thinking will 
enable SF FGOs to influence success and meet the nation’s strategic objectives. 
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C. STRATEGIC THINKING IS A PROVEN SKILL 
Strategic thinking has enabled SOF leaders to influence success throughout modern 
military history. They have proved themselves as adaptive problem-solvers in the strategic 
environment by demonstrating the cognitive competencies that form strategic thinking: 
systems thinking, thinking in time, critical thinking, creative thinking, and intuitive 
thinking. Leaders such as General Stanley McChrystal, General Robert McClure, Brigadier 
General Leroy Manor, Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle, and Captain Vernon Gillespie 
influenced success by applying strategic thinking. General McChrystal’s systems approach 
enabled him to understand the strategic ecosystem and implement solutions that increased 
the effectiveness of the U.S.’s counter-terrorism efforts in support of the Global War on 
Terrorism. General McClure used a historical perspective to apply the appropriate lessons 
from past special operations units to establish Army Special Forces as a permanent 
unconventional warfare capability. BG Manor’s critical thinking throughout the planning 
and rehearsals for Operation KINGPIN resulted in seamless execution of the raid at Son 
Tay. LTC Doolittle’s creative thinking produced innovative solutions that overcame 
disadvantages to conduct a surprise attack on the Japanese mainland. CPT Gillespie’s and 
Team A-312’s intuitive thinking resulted in quick, decisive actions that disrupted the 
Montagnard Uprising of 1964. The strategic thinking of all these SOF leaders in strategic 
environments described as complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid highlight the 
timelessness and significance of strategic thinking. Likewise, the absence of strategic 
thinking has contributed to unintended strategic consequences such as those of Operation 
EAGLE CLAW and the Battle of Mogadishu. Strategic thinking provides SF FGOs with a 
timeless and proven decision-making skill to influence desired strategic outcomes and meet 
U.S. objectives. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future research by educational experts and the military can identify the proper 
methods to develop strategic thinking for SF FGOs and the subsequent solutions for 
implementation in PME. This research has argued for PME to emphasize the development 
of strategic thinking skill for SF FGOs by highlighting the skill’s timeless relevance 
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towards the conduct of SF tasks and its value to facilitate adaptive problem-solving in a 
complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and fluid strategic environment.  
First, future research must identify proven methods and processes that develop 
strategic thinking. The research should rely heavily on educational experts with 
backgrounds in the five cognitive competencies identified by this research:  systems 
thinking, thinking in time, critical thinking, creative thinking, and intuitive thinking. This 
reliance will mitigate solutions that only match curriculum course titles with cognitive 
skills. 
Second, a detailed critique of Army PME must be conducted to identify where 
current PME meets the requirements to develop strategic thinking for SF FGOs and where 
it is deficient. Such analysis should include all educational venues available to SF FGOs 
throughout PME as some cognitive competencies may require initial development at earlier 
stages of an SF FGOs career. For example, the development of intuitive thinking may need 
to begin at the ARSOF career course as it can produce immediate value before the field 
grade level. Feedback from job performance will likely be the only true measure of 
strategic thinking, thus identifying the feedback mechanism to measure whether SF FGO 
strategic thinking is of equal importance. 
Third, courses of action (COA) should be developed for implementation with 
appropriate influence and ownership given to the SOF Commands charged with overseeing 
SF capability. These COAs should be easily differentiated and address not only solutions 
for the existing PME and venues, but also provide decision-makers with innovative options 
that address the issue. For example, the optimal solution for SF PME that develops strategic 
thinking might require a stand-alone educational pipeline from that of the conventional 
forces. With these COAs, decision-makers can select the solution that best meets their 
intended educational outputs for SF FGOs. 
Lastly, research must identify the detailed plan for implementation of the selected 
COA. This step is critical for success. Poor implementation could negate the efforts in prior 
steps and result in a squandered opportunity to properly educate SF FGOs. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
SF’s ability to succeed in the current and future strategic environments will depend 
in large part on the strategic thinking capability of SF FGOs. Strategic thinking is a vital 
skill for SF FGOs that must be emphasized for development throughout their PME. The 
latest tactics and technology should not be overvalued and emphasized above strategic 
thinking; instead, they should augment this timeless and proven decision-making process 
to best prepare SF FGOs to influence success in the strategic environment. Developing SF 
FGO cognitive competence regarding systems thinking, thinking in time, critical thinking, 
creative thinking, and intuitive thinking will arm them with the strategic thinking necessary 
to influence success. Further steps are necessary to adequately address the deficiencies of 
PME regarding SF FGO strategic thinking development:  1) proven processes and methods 
to develop strategic thinking must be identified, 2) critiques of current PME and venues 
conducted, 3) courses of action developed, and 3) detailed implementation plan executed. 
The reward of these efforts is the production of adaptive problem-solving SF FGOs who 
can influence desired strategic objectives in the most challenging of environments. As SF’s 
unconventional warfare capability rises in demand, it is imperative for PME to adequately 
prepare SF FGOs for the challenges that await them by developing their strategic thinking 
skills. 
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